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Industrial relations reform in Australia:
implications for the agricultural and
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{
Anne Hawke and Mark Wooden*
A major transformation in the processes that underpin industrial relations
arrangements in Australia appears to have occurred during the last decade. The
tribunal-based systems of conciliation and arbitration that have shaped labour-
management relationships now play a far less pivotal role, and the system of
awards is far less central to the determination of wages and conditions. Greater
scope now exists for employees and employers to tailor their industrial relationship
to the needs of the enterprise. This article provides an overview of the development
of both collective and non-collective bargaining within the formal framework,
and the likely impacts of such developments.
1. Introduction
The nature and role of labour market institutions in Australia appear to have
changed dramatically during the past decade. The most obvious manifesta-
tion of these changes has been the shift towards more decentralised systems
for formal industrial relations arrangements. Prior to the late 1980s,
employment conditions for the vast majority of Australian employees were
heavily dependent on highly prescriptive multi-employer awards, determined
on their behalf by third parties who were removed from the workplace.
Today, awards are much more likely to simply de¢ne minimum standards,
with the wages and employment conditions that prevail in practice often
being the result of direct negotiations between individual workers (or their
representatives) and employers.
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attention is devoted to the development, scope and coverage of formal
enterprise bargaining, including the distinction between collective and non-
collective agreements. The likely impacts of such developments on Australian
workplaces and workers are then discussed. The article then turns to a brief
discussion of the implications of industrial relations reform for the
agriculture and mining sectors.
2. Sowing the seeds of reform
For most of the twentieth century, the legislative basis for Commonwealth
industrial relations was de¢ned by the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904.
This Act regulated the operations of the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission (from here on referred to as `the Commission') until 1988 when
it was replaced by the Industrial Relations Act 1988. While the 1904 Act
was amended more than seventy times, and the primacy of the Commission
(and other tribunals) in the determination of wages and employment has
waxed and waned, tribunal-administered awards and national wages cases
remained the main instruments through which wages and conditions of
employment for Australian workers were determined.
By the early 1980s, however, the pressures for reform and change that had
been building throughout the previous decade were immense. As discussed in
Hawke and Wooden (1998), a number of factors, including structural change,
rising unemployment, increased competition in product markets, the
emergence of new skills-biased technologies and changing work organisation
(especially the increased decentralisation of corporate structures and the
greater emphasis given to `£exible' work practices), were working together to
undermine both centralised bargaining processes and trade union power.
In 1983, however, the Hawke Labor Government came to power federally
with a mandate to pursue a corporatist agenda which, through its Prices
and Incomes Accord with the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU),
actually involved the re-centralisation of bargaining. The Hawke Govern-
ment did, however, recognise the need to at least subject the industrial
relations systems to increased scrutiny and hence established a Committee of
Review of Australian Industrial Relations chaired by Professor Keith
Hancock. Reporting in 1985, the Hancock Committee concluded that
the systems which had served Australia for nearly eight decades were
fundamentally sound and required only marginal change. These changes
included the recasting of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act and the
development of arrangements which would allow parties to `opt-out' of
awards. The declaration of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 represented the
adoption of the ¢rst of these recommendations.
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the previous legislative history of amending the existing governing
legislation, in line with the Hancock recommendations, it was broadly
similar in character to the previous Act. The notable exception to this broad
generalisation was the `opting out' provisions. Speci¢cally, sections 112 and
115 of the new Act permitted parties (which by de¢nition included trade
unions and employers) to establish employment conditions without the
requirement that a log of claims or dispute exist. Section 112 provided for
consent awards (that is, awards which were reached by mutual consent
between parties and rati¢ed by the Commission) whereas section 115
provided for the implementation of agreements certi¢ed by the
Commission.
While Part X of the previous Act did provide for parties to use `industrial
agreements' without recourse to compulsory conciliation and arbitration,
decisions handed down by the High Court in 1913 severely limited the scope
of Part X, and e¡ectively put an end to such agreements (see McCallum
and Smith 1986).
1 The inclusion of sections 112 and 115 in the new Act thus
represented an attempt by government to reintroduce greater degrees of
voluntarism to the federal industrial relations system which, according to
McCallum and Smith (1986), was more in line with the intentions of the
architects of the 1904 Act.
Under the new provisions, parties could negotiate above the existing
award conditions on any matter which was relevant to their employment
relationship.
2 Despite this rediscovered opportunity, relatively few employers
took advantage of the new provisions. For example, in the three years
following the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act 1988, only 122
applications under section 115 were approved by the Commission.
3
According to Plowman (1992), use of section 115 was deliberately curtailed
by the Commission. Confronted by `the co-existence of an arbitration stream
that is required to provide general industrial standards in the public interest,
and of a bargaining stream that may enable parties to circumvent those
standards' (p. 284), the Commission chose to apply highly restrictive
guidelines which saw many applications for section 115 agreements rejected.
1Some use was made of Part X by parties seeking to use private arbitration to resolve
local grievances.
2Negotiation over matters which were subject to legislation beyond the Industrial
Relations Act such as equal pay, occupational health and safety and anti-discrimination was
excluded.
3This ¢gure is drawn from technical notes to Wage Trends in Enterprise Bargaining, a
quarterly newsletter published by the Department of Industrial Relations.
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rendering the section 115 route an unattractive option to many employers.
Finally, and as observed by Plowman (1992), most of the 122 agreements
that were implemented were not intended to have a substantive impact on
employment conditions. Most were both short in duration and brief in
content (typically containing six or fewer substantive clauses: Plowman 1992,
p. 290).
At the same time as these legislative developments were occurring,
important changes in the nature of the Accords which underpinned wages
policy were taking place. Ultimately, these changes were to prove highly
signi¢cant in fostering an environment conducive to the development of a
more decentralised system. In March 1987, for example, the Commission
agreed to the introduction of a two-tiered wages system (as recommended in
Accord Mark III) under which all workers were to receive national wage
case adjustments, with a second tier providing up to a further 4 per cent to
workers whose trade union could negotiate a wage increase at the enterprise
level. While this process was highly regulated, with all increases requiring
the endorsement of the Commission (which was achieved by satisfying the
Commission that equivalent productivity o¡sets were to be delivered), it
represented yet another important break with the centralist approach of the
past. Indeed, for the ¢rst time, workplace or enterprise productivity became
the basis for legally enforceable wage outcomes of federally covered
workers.
Despite the in-principle e¡ect of the productivity/wages trade-o¡, the
reality proved to be somewhat di¡erent. Analyses of second tier agreements
by both Frenkel and Shaw (1989) and Reilly (1989), for example, concluded
that many of these agreements did not produce any real productivity
improvements or, if improvements were achieved, they were not sustainable.
Indeed Dawkins, Dufty and Norris (1988, p. 36) argued that this system gave
trade unions an incentive to introduce restrictive work practices in order that
these practices could be traded for wage increases in the future.
In 1988, the Commission, recognising the potential problems associated
with the two-tier approach, developed the Structural E¤ciency Principle
(SEP). Under this approach, wage increases were linked to negotiations of
award variations which facilitated increases in competitiveness and e¤ciency
of the industry ö a process commonly referred to as award restructuring.
As noted by Wooden (1990, p. 60), award restructuring was not intended to
be enterprise based. `It is aimed, by de¢nition, at awards and, by association,
at the industry level.'
As with the second tier, the available evidence suggested that the SEP
was not e¡ective in achieving productivity gains, at least not in the short
term. Partly as a result of the extensive `protections' provided by the system,
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number of industries. Survey results reported in Sloan and Wooden (1990),
for example, indicated a general failure of ¢rms to implement the industry-
agreed changes. Similarly, Still and Mortimer (1993) reported results which
were broadly supportive of these ¢ndings, leading them to conclude that
award restructuring had a minimal e¡ect at the enterprise level.
In conclusion, it is now widely accepted that neither the second tier nor
the SEP had a signi¢cant impact on the way employment relationships in the
workplace were structured. Nevertheless, the greater emphasis on workplace
performance and productivity helped create an environment in which a more
truly enterprise-based system would be more receptively viewed by employers
and trade unions as the next progression in industrial relations reform.
3. Formal enterprise bargaining
By the end of the 1980s the environment was one where nearly all of the
relevant parties, though not the Commission, were supportive of further
decentralisation of bargaining structures. The business community was
pushing strongly for the introduction of enterprise-based structures, a
position which was being vigorously advocated by the Business Council of
Australia (see BCA Industrial Relations Study Commission 1989). Even the
ACTU had began canvassing its own version of enterprise bargaining, with
support for an enterprise-based bargaining system being a key element of
Accord Mark VI, negotiated in 1990.
The Commission, however, was at best a reluctant supporter of enterprise
bargaining. It rejected the concept in its December 1990 National Wage
Case, drawing criticism from all parties, before ¢nally introducing its own
Enterprise Bargaining Principle in October 1991. However, as with the
second tier and the SEP, the Enterprise Bargaining Principle was inconsistent
with the requirements of the parties. Consequently, in 1992, section 134 of
the Industrial Relations Act 1988 was amended in a way that ensured
enterprise bargains did not have to satisfy all of the requirements that had
been imposed by the Commission.
Further impetus to enterprise bargaining was provided by the Industrial
Relations Reform Act 1993. A key feature of the Act was the introduction of
Enterprise Flexibility Agreements (EFAs). Unlike the existing Certi¢ed
Agreements, EFAs could be negotiated without union involvement.
4
4These agreements were non-union in the sense that groups of employees negotiated with
management, rather than unions and management negotiating (as is the case with certi¢ed
agreements). It is possible, however, that some of the employees who negotiated an EFA at
their workplace were trade union members.
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bargaining, only 156 were ever approved (DIR 1996, p. 62). One explanation
for the poor response to the additional £exibility provided by EFAs was
again the exhaustive rati¢cation process. In addition to passing the con-
ditions for rati¢cation required for certi¢ed agreements, EFAs were subject
to additional compliance tests (mainly associated with informed consent).
Additionally, although an EFA represented the outcome from direct
negotiations between groups of employees and their employers, it was
necessary to notify relevant trade unions of negotiations which were being
undertaken as part of the agreement-making process. This provided trade
unions with the opportunity to identify lowly unionised ¢rms which were
vulnerable to recruitment campaigns.
Finally, and most recently, industrial relations reform has been provided
renewed vigour through the Workplace Relations Act 1996. The main
development under this Act was that for the ¢rst time, agreements
between individuals and their employer could be formalised without the
intervention of unions.
5 That is, provision was made for employers to
formalise the result of their negotiations with each employee. These
agreements, called Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs), may be
negotiated with employees on either an individual or collective basis.
6
Unlike Certi¢ed Agreements, AWAs can be reached without reference to
the Commission, although they are still subject to review by the recently
created O¤ce of the Employment Advocate.
7 Furthermore, and unlike
informal agreements, the new legislation provides scope for both Certi¢ed
Agreements and AWAs to reduce individual award entitlements so long
as, when viewed in total, the agreement does not represent a reduction in
entitlements (that is, employees are not disadvantaged by the agreement).
AWAs are also unique when compared with other formal agreements in
that they remain con¢dential to the parties involved (unless otherwise
agreed).
5It is possible (although unlikely) that trade unions may be appointed as a bargaining
agent in the negotiation of an AWA.
6When negotiated on a collective basis, each individual covered by the agreement must
indicate consent in order that they be covered by the agreement.
7Although the Employment Advocate has the power to approve or disallow AWAs, in
cases where there is some doubt regarding the ability of the AWA to meet legislative
requirements such as the no-disadvantage test, the AWA may be referred to the
Commission. Unlike certi¢ed agreements, the Commission is required to hold submissions
on AWAs in closed hearings.
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agreements during the 1990s has been signi¢cant and substantial. This
is illustrated in ¢gure 1 which shows the number of employees covered
by both federal wage and non-wage agreements steadily increasing since
1993. Indeed, between October 1991 and October 1997 around 15000
federal agreements were formalised by the Commission, with the
number of employees estimated to be covered by these agreements
reaching an estimated 1.74 million employees (Joint Governments'
Submissions 1997, p. 89) by September 1996. This total represents
about 64 per cent of employees within the coverage of the federal
awards system and about 25 per cent of all employed wage and salary
earners in Australia. In contrast, unpublished data indicate that in June
1993, only 35 per cent of federal award employees were covered by
an enterprise agreement.
Growth in the coverage of employees by enterprise agreements has also
been apparent within the State systems though, as Quinlan (1996) notes, the
spread of enterprise agreements has developed more slowly within the State
jurisdictions. In the State systems, at the end of March 1997, around 6869
collective agreements had been formalised. These agreements are estimated
to have represented approximately 800000 workers, or about one-third of all
State award employees (excluding Victoria). As reported in Hawke and
Wooden (1998), the rates of coverage (of award-based employees) varied
from just 6 per cent in Tasmania up to 39 per cent in Queensland (Joint
Government's Submission 1997, p. 91). In total, therefore, the coverage of
Figure 1 Employee coverage of federal enterprise agreements, 1993^97
Sources: DIR, Wage Trends in Enterprise Bargaining (various issues) and unpublished data.
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would appear to be close to 50 per cent.
8
Turning to formalised individual-based agreements, far less is known,
mainly because negotiating such agreements within the formal federal
jurisdiction has only recently become possible ö AWAs became operational
on 12 March 1997. The evidence to date though does suggest that the uptake
is relatively slow, with around 7500 AWAs covering just 360 employers
having been lodged by 31 December 1997. This rate of lodgement is,
however, not surprising for the following reasons. First, it is possible that
some enterprises which may desire individual-based agreements are currently
locked in to collective agreements reached under the previous Act. Second,
AWAs represent the ¢rst opportunity for formalised individual arrangements
between employees and employers. It is possible that certi¢ed agreements
were readily adopted since they largely relied upon negotiations between
trade unions and employers which had a tradition of negotiating wages and
conditions of employment under awards. Third, provision of individual
agreements through AWAs may stimulate parties to reach individual
agreements while failing to provide the incentives for them to formalise these
arrangements.
4. The impact of enterprise agreements
The data reported in the previous section highlight what would appear
to be, at least on the surface, an impressive shift towards enterprise-based
bargaining arrangements. Enterprise agreements, however, can vary enorm-
ously in terms of what they deliver, and it is undoubtedly the content and
subject matter of agreements which are critical in determining their
signi¢cance. Buchanan et al. (1997, p. 101), for example, cite data which
suggest that in the period prior to the introduction of the Workplace
Relations Act only 5 per cent of employees had their wages and conditions
determined wholly by (registered) enterprise agreements, a further 30 per
cent had their employment regulated by a combination of awards and
agreements, 35 per cent were entirely dependent on awards, and 30 per cent
were dependent on conditions speci¢ed in individual contracts negotiated
outside the purview of industrial tribunals. These ¢gures suggest that for the
large majority of employees covered by enterprise agreements, the agreement
has to be read in conjunction with awards.
8It must, of course, be borne in mind that not all employees are covered by awards, and
that the proportion of employees covered by awards is, in all likelihood, falling. (ABS
estimates suggest award coverage fell from 88 per cent to 80 per cent between 1974 and
1990.)
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only do agreements not wholly replace the award, but that the agreements
often only touch upon a narrow range of work conditions (Wooden,
Robertson and Cernaz 1996). At a more general level, there appears to be
some disagreement about the extent to which agreements vary employment
conditions in some substantive way or the extent to which they are simply
`add-ons' to awards. The DIR in its 1994 Annual Report into Enterprise
Bargaining (DIR 1995, p. 135) adopted the positive stance. A year later,
however, the DIR reversed its position, claiming that most agreements were
in fact `merely ``add-ons'' to their parent award' (DIR 1996, p. 126). This
latter conclusion appears to be more consistent with other assessments based
on other data, including ACCI (1995) and Callus (1997). Indeed, Callus
(1997) concludes, based on data from the Agreements Data Base and
Monitor (ADAM) maintained by the Australian Centre for Industrial
Relations Research and Training, that in recent years `agreements have
become less detailed and there seems to be less inclination to see agreements
as a means of dramatically reforming workplace industrial relations' (p. 20).
Such conclusions are not unexpected for a number of reasons. First, the
federal system of basing agreements on awards through the application of
the `no disadvantage test' has limited the incentive for employers to negotiate
comprehensive agreements (DIR 1995, p. 126). Under this test, agreements
are bound by the minimum entitlements identi¢ed in the relevant award.
9
Second, organisations without a history of bargaining can be expected to
lack the resources or the inclination to develop comprehensive agreements
(DIR 1995, p. 135). Third, many organisations may ¢nd that existing award
conditions do not constrain their workplace operations and hence have little
incentive to include these issues in an enterprise agreement.
10
It is therefore not clear that enterprise agreements are necessarily
delivering outcomes that are greatly di¡erent from that which would have
been delivered in their absence, either through awards or through over-award
bargaining. However, to analyse this question requires data linking
agreements to actual outcomes, rather than data on provisions within
agreements. Unfortunately, the only relevant data are attitudinal data
collected as part of the 1995 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations
9It is now possible for agreements to contain clauses which have lower wages and
conditions than those identi¢ed in the awards, so long as when viewed as a whole, the
agreement does not represent a lower level of entitlement when compared to the award. This
test is evaluated by the Commission during the rati¢cation procedures.
10As reported in DIR (1995, fn. 11, p. 135), data from the 1989^90 Australian Workplace
Industrial Relations Survey indicated that only 7 per cent of managers (at workplaces with
20 or more employees) identi¢ed awards as a major constraint on industrial relations.
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of workplace performance, are likely to be a¡ected by substantial
measurement error and biases (see Rimmer and Watts 1994a and the
subsequent interchange ö Crockett, Dawkins and Mulvey 1994; Rimmer
and Watts 1994b).
These data were originally reported in DIR (1996, pp. 129-34), and are
summarised here in table 1. The performance indicators used are labour
productivity, workplace pro¢tability, product/service quality, absenteeism
and employee skill levels. The data were collected from a sample of
approximately 2000 managers at workplaces with 20 or more employees,
though only managers at workplaces with a collective agreement are able to
respond. In general, the results suggest that most managers assess agree-
ments as having had either no e¡ect or a slightly marginal positive e¡ect on
workplace performance. Only with respect to absenteeism was this not true.
The relatively high proportions reporting no impact on absenteeism,
however, is not surprising given that the major source of absenteeism at

















Part VIB agreement 13 49 38 0 0
State agreement 15 37 43 4 1
Unregistered agreement 11 59 28 2 0
Workplace pro¢tability
Part VIB agreement 9 38 42 9 2
State agreement 2 32 58 5 3
Unregistered agreement 7 37 43 11 2
Quality of product/service
Part VIB agreement 9 41 50 0 0
State agreement 6 32 58 3 1
Unregistered agreement 19 36 44 1 0
Absenteeism
Part VIB agreement 2 10 70 12 5
State agreement 2 16 62 15 5
Unregistered agreement 0 13 65 18 4
Employee skills
Part VIB agreement 9 36 52 3 0
State agreement 5 41 54 0 0
Unregistered agreement 5 44 51 0 0
Source: DIR (1996, pp. 130^133).
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and Wooden 1995). Indeed, it is possible that if collective agreements are
associated with an intensi¢cation of work, absence levels may rise, possibly
explaining why a sizeable minority reported an increase in absence levels as a
consequence of the introduction of agreements.
Callus (1997, pp. 20^1) interprets these data as implying very mixed
results. On the other hand, our own interpretation of these data is less
pessimistic. The relatively restricted range of response options (just ¢ve) will
almost certainly constrain responses to the middle three options, given: (i)
the many other factors that are likely to impact on business performance;
and (ii) respondents to attitudinal survey questions tend to avoid the polar
extremes. The relatively large numbers of respondents indicating that
outcomes had improved `a little' should therefore be treated as a positive
¢nding.
Another interesting aspect of the data presented in table 1 is the
comparison between workplaces with formal agreements (represented by
Part VIB and State agreements) and workplaces with informal agreements
(represented by unregistered agreements). In terms of labour productivity,
outcome quality and skill levels of employees, informal agreements proved
more likely to have achieved positive bene¢ts than formal agreements. Given
this result, it is perhaps di¤cult to understand the incentives for enterprises
to utilise formal agreement-making provisions of legislative reforms given
that informal agreements may well lead to better workplace outcomes. One
likely explanation is that the types of workplaces where formal agreement-
making takes place are very di¡erent from workplaces where informal
agreement-making prevails. Certainly we would expect a higher level of
unionisation at the former than at the latter. Isolating the impact of formal
agreements vis-a © -vis informal agreements will thus require controlling for
workplace and ¢rm characteristics. More generally, registration of agree-
ments, at least under the Workplace Relations Act 1996, provides the only
mechanism by which award conditions can be legally reduced. Further,
registration provides a straightforward and immediate mechanism for
enforcing compliance with conditions speci¢ed in the agreement.
5. Implications for the agriculture and mining sectors
Given the incremental nature of change, it follows that the consequences
for outcomes in all sectors are likely to have been modest, and that it may
well be a good deal longer before signi¢cant changes in practice and
behaviour manifest at the workplace level. However, even if it is assumed
that the reform process is already making a notable di¡erence at the
workplace level, there are good reasons to expect that the e¡ect of industrial
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agricultural and mineral resource sectors may be more limited than in other
sectors. Most obviously, in both agriculture and mining, labour costs
account for a relatively small share of total input costs. As documented in
table 2, between 1992^93 and 1995^96 labour costs (wages, salaries and
supplements) represented 24 per cent of the total gross product in
agriculture, forestry and ¢shing and 29 per cent of the gross product in
mining. In contrast, in manufacturing industry labour costs represented
around 56 per cent of gross product, while in the services sector it averaged
53 per cent of gross product. It thus follows that reforms which impact on
labour costs (through improvements in productivity) will be of less
signi¢cance to the agriculture and mining sectors than they will be to
producers in other more labour-intensive sectors.
It is likely, however, that the impact of industrial relations reform on the
agriculture and mining sectors could still be quite di¡erent. The main reason
for this is the di¡erence in the award and agreement coverage in each of the
sectors. Coverage of agriculture workers by the formal system is extremely
low whereas in mining it is relatively high. This is potentially of large
importance given industrial relations reform is largely about changes to the
formalised institutions and processes of industrial relations. Thus, if the large
majority of workers within the agriculture sector are not represented within
the formal award-based system, they are unlikely to be much a¡ected by the
reform process.
Although o¤cial statistics on award coverage within the agriculture sector
do not exist, low levels of coverage are generally assumed given:
1. the high incidence of self-employment (44 per cent of all agriculture
workers were de¢ned as `own account workers' by the ABS in August
1997);
2. the importance of family labour in agriculture (Ferguson 1998);
Table 2 Wages, salaries and supplements as a percentage of gross product by industry sector, 1992^93
to 1995^96
1992^93 1993^94 1994^95 1995^96 Average
Agriculture, forestry and ¢shing 22.8 23.1 27.4 21.8 23.8
Mining 28.9 29.8 29.0 28.1 29.0
Manufacturing 58.0 56.1 55.3 55.5 56.2
Construction 58.9 57.9 56.5 59.1 58.1
Services 55.3 55.0 54.9 55.0 55.1
Total 53.7 53.2 53.2 53.0 53.3
Source: ABS, Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product, 1995^96, ABS
cat. no. 6204.0.
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agriculture workers were classi¢ed by the ABS as belonging to the
`manager and administrator' occupational grouping in August 1997);
and
4. extremely low rates of unionisation (just 6.6 per cent of employees in
the agriculture sector in August 1996 were members of a trade union).
In contrast, according to the most recent ABS survey of award coverage,
undertaken in May 1990, 74 per cent of employees in the mining industry
were measured as covered by awards, determinations and collective
agreements. This compares with an all industry average (but excluding
agriculture, which was excluded from the scope of the survey) of 80 per cent.
It should be noted, however, that award coverage within the mining sector
is highly variable. For example, we suspect that, re£ecting the higher rates of
unionisation in coal mining, award coverage will be commensurably higher
in coal mining than in other mining sectors.
11
For similar reasons, the incidence of registered collective agreements is
also likely to be relatively low in agriculture, but much higher in mining.
Here data do exist (from the Federal Workplace Agreements Database) and
our suspicions are con¢rmed. As reported in table 3, only 0.4 per cent of
all employees covered by registered federal collective agreements in 1995
were working in the agriculture industry. By comparison, just over 2 per cent


















18 0.5 0.4 2.2 0.18
Mining 57 1.7 1.1 1.2 0.92
Manufacturing 1204 36.7 19.5 15.1 1.29
Construction 540 16.5 2.3 5.1 0.45
Services 1458 44.6 76.7 76.4 1.00
All industries 3277 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes:
a Agreements data cover federal Part VIB agreements only.
b Employment data are for the month of August.
Sources: DIR (1996, tables 2.8 and 2.9, pp. 36 and 39).
Unpublished data from ABS Labour Force Survey.
11According to the ABS Trade Union Members Survey, 85.2 per cent of coal mining
employees were trade union members in August 1996. In the other mining sectors the total
rate of unionisation was just 24.6 per cent.
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ratio of covered employees to total employment in the agriculture sector. In
contrast, mining employees represented 1.1 per cent of all employees covered
by agreements, which is almost identical to the proportion of total employees
working in the mining sector.
As implied above, low levels of award (and agreement) coverage are likely
to indicate reliance on informal processes and structures. This in turn is
likely to re£ect a greater degree of £exibility in the face of external shocks.
This is of large signi¢cance to the agriculture and mining sectors given the
export orientation of both. Unlike many other sectors of the economy,
agriculture and mining producers have, for the most part, long been exposed
to the forces of international competition. As such, these sectors are highly
vulnerable to external shocks. Surviving adverse shocks will require either
the presence of greater levels of technical e¤ciency among Australian
producers compared with their overseas competitors, or the ability to quickly
adjust factor costs and quantities, including labour. In the mining sector,
where work practices vary by mine and are signi¢cant determinants of
productivity, and especially in coal mining, the ability to vary factor costs
and quantities is likely to be much more limited (Foots 1998). Industrial
relations reform in this case is potentially of large importance, and
undoubtedly underlies the protracted disputes that are still ongoing in the
coal mining industry.
Finally, even if industrial relations reform does not bring direct bene¢ts
to agriculture and mining producers, indirect bene¢ts may still £ow as a
result of the impacts of reform on downstream industries with strong input/
output linkages to agriculture and mining. Ferguson (1998), for example,
discusses in some detail the potential gains for farm pro¢tability that can
arise from increased productivity in the meat processing and waterfront
industries. Similarly, the mining industry stands to bene¢t from increased
productivity in other sectors, especially rail transport and port services (see
BIE 1996, p. 103).
6. Conclusion
Major transformations in the structures and processes that underpin
industrial relations arrangements in Australia appeared to have occurred
during the last decade. Appearances, however, can be deceiving. The
Commission, for example, despite legislative change designed to limit its
in£uence, continues to act as an arbiter of national and award-based minima
in pay and conditions and as a means of conciliation and arbitration.
Furthermore, while the introduction of enterprise and individual agreements
within the awards system is a signi¢cant change, it does not yet a constitute
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to approval by either the Commission, or the newly-formed O¤ce of the
Employment Advocate. Moreover, it is not clear that enterprise agreements
are necessarily delivering outcomes that are greatly di¡erent from that which
would have been delivered in their absence, either through awards, over-
award bargaining or other informal agreements. Evidence on the content of
agreements suggests that many may be nothing more than `add-ons' to the
parent award. Survey evidence also suggests only modest impacts on
workplace performance, and it could be argued that some of the
improvements obtained could just as easily have been obtained through the
use of informal arrangements, which have always been available. Ultimately,
we do not yet have the data necessary to provide an answer to these
questions. Only the changed position and role of the trade union movement
can clearly be judged as transformational, with trade union membership
rates falling from around 50 per cent in the mid-1970s to just 30 per cent in
1997. In this, however, it is di¤cult to ascribe a catalytic role to legislative
and procedural reform.
The reform process may therefore better be described as evolutionary
rather than revolutionary. Change, when it has occurred, has tended to be
incremental in nature. As a result it may be a good deal longer before
signi¢cant changes in practice and behaviour manifest themselves at the
workplace level. This does not mean the reforms have not been signi¢cant ö
far from it. As Birmingham (1997, p. 33) observes when discussing the
introduction of the Workplace Relations Act 1996: `It is a huge step from
where we were ten years ago but it is not such a great step from where we
were this time last year.'
However, even given change is taking place, there are good reasons to
expect that the e¡ect of industrial relations reforms in terms of work practices
and outcomes within the agricultural sector may be more limited than in other
sectors. The ratio of labour costs to total costs is relatively small, unionisation
rates are extremely low, and the coverage of workers by the formal systems
is also quite low. These factors combine to increase the likelihood of informal
processes and structures. This, in turn, is likely to re£ect a greater degree of
£exibility in the face of external shocks, which is extremely important given
the importance of the export sector to agriculture.
In mining, and especially coal mining, the situation is quite di¡erent.
While labour costs as a share of total costs are also relatively small, the
coverage of mining employees by awards and agreements is quite high.
Indeed, in coal mining, coverage is likely to be close to complete. Confronted
by an internationally competitive market and diminishing natural advant-
ages, it is not surprising that industrial relations reform is high on the agenda
of many coal producers.
Industrial relations reform 317
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1998Finally, even if industrial relations reform is not of direct signi¢cance to
agriculture and mining producers, indirect bene¢ts may still £ow as a result
input/output linkages to other areas of the economy which have increased
potential for improvements in workplace performance. Most obvious here
are the waterfront, rail transport, and many segments of the manufacturing
sector (such as food processing).
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